Capability library / Application package

CrowdStrike package v1.1.0

CrowdStrike Falcon platform API: read hosts and alerts, view device login history, update alert state and tags, and contain or lift containment on hosts.

Review state: Reviewed · Distributable: yes, digest matches the release manifest

This page describes AAES Govern’s controls. AAES Operate has private-work permissions, operational reviews and recorded-spend limits; it does not include Govern. About AAES Govern

Before you enable this package

The endpoint host 'crowdstrike-api.invalid' is a reserved .invalid placeholder that fails closed until you substitute the real host in both the endpoint URLs and the egress allowlist. The detections.read and detections.update capabilities use the Detects API, which CrowdStrike announced for decommission on 2025-09-30; they may no longer respond. Confirm both endpoints in your tenant before enabling them.

Read each action's effects and exclusions below. Before installation, also read the complete package requirements, including credential issuance, scope, expiry, and provider permissions. These are deployment prerequisites, not capabilities this package supplies.

Capabilities (7)

Each capability below is one registered operation. The complete package JSON includes its exact network destination allowlist. The repository stores it at packs/crowdstrike.json and embeds a copy in the release binary.

Versions. This package is version 1.1.0. Its capabilities carry their own version numbers: 5 at version 1.0.0, 2 at version 1.1.0, as shown on each capability below.

Risk tiers. R0 is the minimum for reads. R2 is the minimum for write, create, update, execute, and invoke. R3 is the minimum for delete, send, pay, deploy, approve, share, and transfer. Operators can raise these levels. A minimum tier does not measure the operation's business or confidentiality risk.

On supported execution paths routed through AAES Govern, the R3 actions listed below require approval by an authorized person. Bypass paths and observation-only registrations are outside that guarantee. A provider's restoration feature does not remove this approval requirement. A provider-side approval, such as approving a GitLab merge request, is also separate from AAES Govern human approval. The capability matrix shows which execution paths are implemented, restricted to lab use, or refused at startup. Live compatibility must be tested in your environment.

Field guide. Endpoint is the service address and request method. Connector is the adapter that makes the call. Custody describes how the credential is held; the credential reference identifies the value to resolve. Data class sets handling requirements: pii means personal data, financial means financial records, and internal means internal organizational data.

crowdstrike.hosts.read v1.0.0R0

Kind
tool
Action
read
Endpoint
GET https://crowdstrike-api.invalid/devices/combined/devices/v1
Connector
http
Custody
customer_vault
Credential ref
secret-ref-crowdstrike-oauth-token
Data class
internal

Read hosts.

Search hosts and return full device records: hostnames, IPs, platform, agent and containment status. Operation and route verified against the retrieved vendor SDK reference (FalconPy Hosts collection: CombinedDevicesByFilter, GET /devices/combined/devices/v1, 'Search for hosts. Returns full device records.', Hosts: READ scope, retrieved 2026-09-21). Registered as the collection read; single-id detail reads (devices/entities/devices) are not registered. Requires the Hosts read scope.

The host is a reserved placeholder: substitute the customer's Falcon base API host before enabling.

crowdstrike.device_login_history.read v1.0.0R0

Kind
tool
Action
read
Endpoint
POST https://crowdstrike-api.invalid/devices/combined/devices/login-history/v2
Connector
http
Custody
customer_vault
Credential ref
secret-ref-crowdstrike-oauth-token
Data class
pii

Read device login history.

Retrieve recent login sessions for a set of device ids; the response names the users who logged in, so the read is classified as pii (personal data). The operation is a POST with a read-only effect (ids in the request body; the retrieved vendor SDK reference documents no maximum on the ids array — the documented 100 cap applies to the result limit, default 10) and requires the Hosts read scope.

The host is a reserved placeholder: substitute before enabling.

crowdstrike.alerts.read v1.1.0R0

Kind
tool
Action
read
Endpoint
GET https://crowdstrike-api.invalid/alerts/queries/alerts/v2
Connector
http
Custody
customer_vault
Credential ref
secret-ref-crowdstrike-oauth-token
Data class
internal

Read alerts.

Search alert ids matching an FQL filter, with offset pagination, sort and an optional include_hidden flag (CrowdStrike Alerts collection, GetQueriesAlertsV2, GET /alerts/queries/alerts/v2, 'Retrieves all Alerts ids that match a given query'; the limit defaults to 100, maximum 10000). Registered as the query read; alert detail retrieval (PostEntitiesAlertsV2), aggregates and the deprecated v1 query are not registered. Requires the Alerts read scope. This capability replaces crowdstrike.detections.read@1.0.0, which used the Detects collection that CrowdStrike decommissioned on 2025-09-30.

The host is a reserved placeholder: substitute before enabling.

crowdstrike.alerts.update v1.1.0R2

Kind
tool
Action
update
Endpoint
PATCH https://crowdstrike-api.invalid/alerts/entities/alerts/v3
Connector
http
Custody
customer_vault
Credential ref
secret-ref-crowdstrike-oauth-token
Data class
internal

Update alerts.

Modify one or more alerts by composite id (PatchEntitiesAlertsV3, PATCH /alerts/entities/alerts/v3): status through update_status, assignment and unassignment, appended comments, tags, and visibility — show_in_ui false hides the alert from the console. Changing status or hiding alerts suppresses analyst visibility of possible intrusion activity; the change is reversible, so the capability sits at the minimum R2 tier for update with the suppression risk stated here and bounded by policy. The request body names the composite ids and action parameters, and this registration does not restrict which alerts or which parameters a caller sends.

Requires the Alerts write scope. This capability replaces crowdstrike.detections.update@1.0.0, which used the Detects collection that CrowdStrike decommissioned on 2025-09-30.

The host is a reserved placeholder: substitute before enabling.

crowdstrike.hosts.contain v1.0.0R3

Kind
tool
Action
deploy
Endpoint
POST https://crowdstrike-api.invalid/devices/entities/devices-actions/v2?action_name=contain
Connector
http
Custody
customer_vault
Credential ref
secret-ref-crowdstrike-oauth-token
Data class
internal

Contain hosts.

Network-contain one or more hosts (action_name 'contain' with the host AIDs in the request body, maximum 100 per call). Containment immediately severs the endpoint's network connectivity except to the Falcon cloud, which can interrupt live production workloads and cannot be presumed consequence-free even though lift_containment exists — it is registered with the deploy action at the minimum R3 tier as a response-action equivalent of deploy, and deploy is one of the designated actions requiring human approval for floor purposes.

The action_name selector is pinned in this registration's endpoint query string (action_name=contain) — the retrieved vendor SDK reference documents action_name as a query parameter of this operation — and the caller cannot alter it, because a caller names a capability, never a destination; the same operation with other action names (hide_host, unhide_host, detection_suppress) is therefore not reachable through this registration. Requires the Hosts write scope.

The host is a reserved placeholder: substitute before enabling.

On supported execution paths mediated by AAES Govern, the declared irreversible actions require an authorized person’s approval. Observation-only and bypass calls cannot be stopped by this control.

crowdstrike.hosts.lift_containment v1.0.0R3

Kind
tool
Actions
update, deploy
Endpoint
POST https://crowdstrike-api.invalid/devices/entities/devices-actions/v2?action_name=lift_containment
Connector
http
Custody
customer_vault
Credential ref
secret-ref-crowdstrike-oauth-token
Data class
internal

Remove host containment.

Lift network containment on one or more hosts (the action_name=lift_containment selector is pinned in this registration's endpoint query string, with the host AIDs in the request body, maximum 100 per call), restoring normal connectivity. Lifting containment changes live endpoint state and re-exposes the network if the host is still compromised, so it declares update and deploy at the minimum R3 tier as a response-action equivalent of deploy — it is not an ordinary reversible edit, and deploy is one of the designated actions requiring human approval.

On supported execution paths mediated by AAES Govern, irreversible actions require approval by an authorized person; this does not prevent calls through bypass or observation-only paths. Requires the Hosts write scope.

The host is a reserved placeholder: substitute before enabling.

crowdstrike.device_tags.update v1.0.0R3

Kind
tool
Actions
update, deploy
Endpoint
PATCH https://crowdstrike-api.invalid/devices/entities/devices/tags/v1
Connector
http
Custody
customer_vault
Credential ref
secret-ref-crowdstrike-oauth-token
Data class
internal

Update device tags.

Append or remove Falcon grouping tags on one or more hosts (action_name add or remove with tags and AIDs in the request body). Grouping tags can drive dynamic host-group membership, which prevention policies may target, so a tag change can indirectly change a host's effective prevention-policy assignment — a live policy-enforcement change, so the capability declares update and deploy at the minimum R3 tier; review downstream group rules before enabling.

Note: the retrieved vendor SDK reference documents this operation's action_name (add or remove) as a request-body field, so the add/remove choice is not restricted by this registration — the tier declaration covers both. Requires the Hosts write scope.

The host is a reserved placeholder: substitute before enabling.

On supported execution paths mediated by AAES Govern, the declared irreversible actions require an authorized person’s approval. Observation-only and bypass calls cannot be stopped by this control.

Credential reference

The credential field names a reference rather than containing credential material. Packs are designed not to contain secrets; the format checks cover only known credential formats and cannot prove that arbitrary text contains no secrets. Installing a package registers its capabilities. Configure the provider credentials, endpoints, and network access, then test the integration in your environment before enabling it.

Reference
secret-ref-crowdstrike-oauth-token
Custody
customer_vault
Injection
header (Authorization)

Configure the value and injection format specified in the package. Assign responsibility for credential rotation and revocation, restrict provider permissions, and keep credential material out of logs and responses.

Complete credential requirements

An OAuth2 bearer access token for the customer's Falcon cloud, held in the client's own secret manager. The stored material must be the complete Authorization header value (scheme included): 'Bearer ' followed by the access token. CrowdStrike API authentication is an OAuth2 client-credentials flow: an external deployment process posts the API client's client_id and client_secret — two secret values, themselves stored under their own vault references — to the Falcon OAuth2 token endpoint and stores the returned access token under this reference; the injector injects the stored value verbatim and performs no token lifecycle itself, so refresh ownership sits entirely with that external process.

Access tokens are short-lived and expire; an expired value fails closed. Deleting or disabling the API client in the Falcon console stops new token issuance, but any already-issued token should be treated as valid until it expires — stopping issuance is not token invalidation, so rotate on suspicion rather than relying on revocation.

Least privilege: create the API client with only the scopes the registered capabilities need (Hosts read and Alerts read for the reads; Hosts write for containment and tags, and Alerts write for alert updates) and prefer separate clients for read-only versus response use, each under its own reference.

Executor hygiene: the value must live only in executor memory for the lifetime of a call, must never be written to logs, traces or diagnostics, and must not appear in crash dumps; a deployment that cannot meet that bar must not enable the pack.

Resources

  • crowdstrike-falcon-devices (api, pii): https://crowdstrike-api.invalid/devices
  • crowdstrike-falcon-alerts (api, internal): https://crowdstrike-api.invalid/alerts

Technical package and review record

Complete provider requirements and exclusions

The endpoint host 'crowdstrike-api.invalid' is a reserved non-production placeholder (an RFC 2606 reserved TLD): substitute the customer's Falcon cloud base API host for their region before enabling, in every endpoint, in the resource locators and in every egress allowlist entry — the allowlist matches exactly, so all three must be substituted together, and substitution is a required deployment step. CrowdStrike operates several regional clouds, and the Falcon console host and the API base host are distinct authorities: substitute the region-specific Falcon API base host for the tenant's cloud (shown alongside the API client in the console's API clients and keys page), not the console host itself.

The pack does not create the API client or mint tokens: an external deployment process creates an OAuth2 API client in the Falcon console, exchanges the client id and secret for an access token at the Falcon OAuth2 token endpoint, and stores and renews the complete header value described in the credential note.

Alert-state changes and host containment are registered as the privileged response actions they are: alerts.update can change alert status and hide alerts from the console (a suppression that reduces analyst visibility) — a reversible status/visibility-only mutation, so it sits at the minimum R2 tier for update with the suppression risk stated in its description and bounded by policy — and hosts.contain severs a live endpoint's network connectivity, registered with the deploy action at the minimum R3 tier as a response-action equivalent of deploy. AID values in request bodies are device ids the deployment binds at call time.

Excluded operations: Real Time Response (RTR) session, command or script operations (live-response shells and arbitrary remote command execution on endpoints), host hiding and unhiding (hide_host / unhide_host actions on the devices-actions endpoint — made an enforceable exclusion by the pinned action_name query selector in the registered containment endpoints), host deletion, prevention-policy assignment or group actions (devices/entities/group-actions), indicator (IOC) management, and Falcon user or API-client management.

Documentation caveat: CrowdStrike's full endpoint reference is served inside the Falcon console behind a customer login and could not be fetched in this review; this pack's endpoints and operation behavior were reviewed against CrowdStrike's public developer hub and the vendor-documented FalconPy SDK reference pages listed in sources, and the tenant deployment review must confirm each path against the in-console API documentation before enabling this reviewed package.

Vendor lifecycle: CrowdStrike decommissioned the Detects service collection on 2025-09-30 and directs developers to the Alerts service collection. Pack version 1.1.0 therefore registers alert search (GET /alerts/queries/alerts/v2) and alert update (PATCH /alerts/entities/alerts/v3) as crowdstrike.alerts.read and crowdstrike.alerts.update, and no longer registers crowdstrike.detections.read or crowdstrike.detections.update; a deployment that installed those 1.0.0 capabilities should retire them. The Alerts operations were checked against CrowdStrike's developer hub API reference for the Alerts collection, retrieved 2026-10-22.

Download the complete package JSON for exact network allowlists, credential requirements, exclusions, and setup notes. Read these requirements before installation.

The full documentation review record is supplied in the evaluation package. The evaluation package runs in your environment and comes only with the paid design partnership. This page reproduces the source links and review block; the full record is available for evaluation. Discuss a design partnership to inspect it before installation.

Review block

This section reproduces the review block recorded in the pack file. The evidence and approval record is separate: for a reviewed pack, it is in the evaluation materials and in the release binary's embedded assets.

Review completed: 2026-10-22

6 sources, retrieved 2026-09-21, 2026-10-22

Current documentation links are navigation aids. They do not change the package, its historical sources or its review date. Review dates describe a documentation review, not a live integration test. No package is provider-endorsed or yet tested against a live provider tenant.

Release identity

SHA-256 of the pack file bytes: 1357b8e368f3410f0aa0fbc088b3e04636f31d2764260cc17f202da10a2b7097

Distributable: yes, digest matches the release manifest. Editing a package changes its release identity. A deployment plan checks its own file digests; it does not restore reviewed status or authenticate approval.