Capability Library · Pack detail

microsoft365 v1.0.0

Microsoft 365 via Microsoft Graph v1.0: read users, mail and calendar events, send mail, create calendar events, and post Teams channel messages.

Review state: library· Distributable: digest matches the release manifest

Release identity

SHA-256 of the pack file bytes: e31563d567d1050c238a2726a89dbd05f3042a4ef81f8cb6b83fedef5ce055d9

Distributable: digest matches the release manifest. The binary carries a digest-bound manifest of the distributable library; a pack whose bytes differ from its manifest entry — endpoint, tier, allowlist, or credential edited, with provider, version, and review block preserved — fails the digest check, loses distributability, and renders MODIFIED rather than as the shipped reviewed artifact. Review state and artifact status are different facts: the first is a documentation-review declaration, the second is the identity of the exact bytes.

Capabilities (6)

microsoft365.users.read v1.0.0R0

Action
read
Endpoint
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users
Connector
http
Custody
customer_vault
Credential ref
secret-ref-msgraph-app-credential
Data class
pii

List the tenant's users: display names, mail addresses, phone numbers and job titles are personal data, so the read is registered at the pii class.

microsoft365.mail.messages.read v1.0.0R0

Action
read
Endpoint
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/USER_ID/messages
Connector
http
Custody
customer_vault
Credential ref
secret-ref-msgraph-app-credential
Data class
pii

Read the messages in one user's mailbox, including Deleted Items. Message bodies, senders and recipients are personal data, so the read is registered at the pii class. USER_ID is a placeholder to replace before enabling.

microsoft365.mail.send v1.0.0R3

Action
send
Endpoint
POST https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/USER_ID/sendMail
Connector
http
Custody
customer_vault
Credential ref
secret-ref-msgraph-app-credential
Data class
pii

Send mail as one user. A sent message cannot be un-sent, and send is one of the IRREVERSIBLE ACTIONS (delete, send, pay, deploy, approve, share and transfer), which is why it carries the R3 floor. Recipients are personal data and the body may carry more, so the capability registers at the pii class. USER_ID is a placeholder to replace before enabling.

microsoft365.calendar.events.read v1.0.0R0

Action
read
Endpoint
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/USER_ID/events
Connector
http
Custody
customer_vault
Credential ref
secret-ref-msgraph-app-credential
Data class
pii

Read the events in one user's calendar, which lives in the mailbox. Attendees, organizers, subjects and bodies are personal data, so the read is registered at the pii class. USER_ID is a placeholder to replace before enabling.

microsoft365.calendar.events.create v1.0.0R3

Actions
create, send
Endpoint
POST https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/USER_ID/events
Connector
http
Custody
customer_vault
Credential ref
secret-ref-msgraph-app-credential
Data class
pii

Create an event in one user's calendar. When the created event includes attendees, the server sends invitations to all attendees, and Microsoft documents that this dispatch cannot be configured — so the capability declares create and send at the R3 floor: send is one of the IRREVERSIBLE ACTIONS (delete, send, pay, deploy, approve, share and transfer), and a dispatched invitation cannot be un-sent even though the calendar entry itself can later be deleted. USER_ID is a placeholder to substitute before enabling.

microsoft365.teams.channel_message.send v1.0.0R3

Action
send
Endpoint
POST https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/teams/TEAM_ID/channels/CHANNEL_ID/messages
Connector
http
Custody
customer_vault
Credential ref
secret-ref-msgraph-delegated-token
Data class
internal

Post a message to a Teams channel. A posted message cannot be un-posted in any way that un-sees it, and send is one of the IRREVERSIBLE ACTIONS (delete, send, pay, deploy, approve, share and transfer), which is why it carries the R3 floor. This capability uses its own credential reference, secret-ref-msgraph-delegated-token: a delegated Microsoft Graph access token carrying the ChannelMessage.Send delegated permission, obtained and renewed by an external process — Microsoft supports application permissions for this operation only in the migration scenario (Teamwork.Migrate.All against a channel in migration mode), which this pack does not register. See the pack notes; TEAM_ID and CHANNEL_ID are placeholders to substitute before enabling.

Credential reference

The pack names a reference, never a secret. Installing a pack registers capabilities and makes them governable; registration is not connectivity. The credential is created at the provider and held in the client's own secret manager under the reference the pack names, and deployment testing is still required to show the credential path works and cannot be bypassed.

Reference
secret-ref-msgraph-app-credential
Custody
customer_vault
Injection
header (Authorization)

The value stored under this reference is the complete Authorization header value (scheme included): 'Bearer ' followed by an OAuth2 access token for Microsoft Graph, minted with the client credentials flow from the client's own app registration against login.microsoftonline.com — POST /{tenant}/oauth2/v2.0/token with scope https://graph.microsoft.com/.default — and placed in the client's own secret manager by an external deployment process. This grant issues no refresh token, so there is no refresh path to review: renewal ownership sits with the external process, which obtains a replacement access token before the current one expires (access tokens last about an hour) and stores the new complete header value. The stored value is never the client secret or certificate assertion material — those stay with the external token process, and a certificate credential is preferable to a client secret for the app registration. Tokens can be revoked by rolling or removing the app registration's credentials; an expired or revoked value fails closed. With client credentials there is no signed-in user, so the token carries application permissions: consent only the minimum set that makes these capabilities work, and weigh before consenting that Mail.Send as an application permission lets the app send mail as any user in the tenant. Executor hygiene: the value must live only in executor memory for the lifetime of a call, must never be written to logs, traces or diagnostics, and must not appear in crash dumps; a deployment that cannot meet that bar must not enable the pack. The Teams channel capability uses a different reference with a delegated-token contract — see the pack notes.

Resources

  • m365-directory (api, pii): https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users
  • m365-mailbox (mailbox, pii): https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/USER_ID
  • teams-channel (channel, pii): https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/teams/TEAM_ID/channels/CHANNEL_ID

Pack notes and exclusions

USER_ID (a user id or userPrincipalName), TEAM_ID and CHANNEL_ID in the endpoint paths are placeholders: the deployment must substitute the concrete user, team and channel each capability is bound to before enabling the pack, and the pack must not be enabled with the literals in place — the review does not rely on Microsoft Graph rejecting literal placeholder identifiers as the control. The egress allowlist stays graph.microsoft.com, a real shared API host, not a placeholder. Use an app registration whose Microsoft Graph permissions cover only what these capabilities need; the pack does not create one. The pack registers endpoints; the deployment chooses scopes, and the application-permission vs delegated-permission distinction is the deployment's decision: application permissions (User.Read.All, Mail.Read, Mail.Send, Calendars.ReadWrite) are tenant-wide daemon-grade power consented by an admin, while delegated permissions act as one signed-in user within that user's own access. microsoft365.teams.channel_message.send carries its own credential reference, secret-ref-msgraph-delegated-token, and the contract is deliberately different from the pack-level reference: Microsoft documents application permissions for posting a channel message only in the migration flow (Teamwork.Migrate.All, against a channel in migration mode), while ordinary channel posting requires the delegated ChannelMessage.Send permission. The stored value under the Teams reference is therefore a delegated Graph access token obtained and renewed by an external process (delegated flows can issue refresh tokens, and that external process owns the refresh) as the complete 'Bearer <token>' header value; the pack-level client-credentials credential cannot perform ordinary channel posting, the migration scenario is not registered by this pack, and the two references are not interchangeable. sendMail and the Teams post both carry the send action at the R3 floor, and send is one of the IRREVERSIBLE ACTIONS (delete, send, pay, deploy, approve, share and transfer): a message that has left cannot be un-sent. Calendar event creation declares create and send at the R3 floor: Microsoft documents that creating an event that includes attendees sends invitations to all attendees, dispatched by the server, and that this cannot be configured — so the unrestricted operation carries the send verb, not a reviewer warning; a create-only R2 variant would require an actually enforced restriction excluding invitation dispatch, which this pack does not register. This pack registers only Microsoft Graph v1.0 endpoints: nothing from the beta endpoint, and no $batch, change notifications or subscriptions, delta queries, OneDrive or SharePoint drives, Teams chats (as opposed to channels), or mail, calendar or Teams update and delete operations — documented exclusions, not approximated capabilities. This pack complements rather than duplicates Microsoft Agent 365's own controls: Agent 365 governs agents on Microsoft's agent platform, while AAES governs any agent calling Microsoft Graph here regardless of which agent platform it runs on. AAES has not been certified by Microsoft; the endpoints here are a reviewable default, not a vendor guarantee.

Review record

Review completed: 2026-09-21 · Reviewer: aaes-eng (an opaque id that resolves internally to the responsible reviewer)

A pack review is not a vendor or examiner attestation. A retrieval date says when a source page was read; it does not by itself establish what the page said then. No pack is vendor-endorsed, and none has been connectivity-tested against a live vendor tenant.