This page explains seven properties of AAES Govern decision records that a reviewer may discuss in an AIUC-1 review. It describes what the product records and the gaps; it does not assess AIUC-1 requirements.
Reading this note
These pages describe the product. They are not a certification or a legal opinion.
AIUC-1 is a certification standard covering six domains: data and privacy, security, safety, reliability, accountability, and society. This page does not assess that catalog.
- Instrument identity
- AIUC-1, a certification standard for AI agents issued by the Artificial Intelligence Underwriting Company. Launched July 2025; revised quarterly.
- Catalog
- Use the current requirements catalog and changelog to identify the applicable edition. Requirements and control activities change through quarterly updates; this note does not assign version-independent totals.
- Certification cadence
- The certification guidance specifies quarterly technical retesting and annual re-audit. The certificate and report must identify the assessed product scope and standard edition.
- Assurance ecosystem
- Authorized auditors exist (Schellman was named the first on 3 February 2026), and the Cloud Security Alliance added AIUC-1 to its STAR Registry on 30 June 2026 (CSA announcement). AAES has not undergone AIUC-1 certification; no audit of AAES against the standard has occurred.
The table covers seven AAES Govern record properties. To assess a specific AIUC-1 requirement, a reviewer would also need its exact ID, the assessed edition, and evidence linking that requirement to the product. Those associations have not been established here. Read it alongside the source instrument at the AIUC-1 standard setter's site.
Use the verification guide to check an export and understand its limits. Checking retained records cannot establish a complete action history or prove the underlying events.
Record formats and integrity checks
AAES Govern writes sealed, hash-chained decision records for routed actions when the journal is writable; a required journal failure denies new decisions without a journal row. The HTTP API names the stored object a receipt at /v1/receipts. The public aaesverify v0.3.0 CLI checks the projected fields and record-hash commitments in the aaes.export/v3 exports current AAES Govern deployments write and in retained aaes.export/v2 exports; the earlier v0.2.0 CLI reads v2 only. The aaes.records/v1 sidecar carries additional stored-record fields; checking their binding to the export requires the separate aaesctl evidence verify check.
How to verify an export is on the verification page.
Each AAES implementation label applies to the product behavior in that row. Read it with the named gap. The labels are not AIUC-1 compliance marks.
- Implemented
- The described record behavior is implemented in AAES Govern. Read it with the named gap.
- Partial
- Some of the described property is supported. A required part remains unexercised or absent.
- Missing
- No implemented record support is recorded for the property.
Record properties
| Property | What records show | Gap | AAES implementation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attribution | Actor, task, grant, and accountable manager are recorded. | Named attribution fields only. This is not an AIUC-1 requirement. | Implemented. |
| Audit trail | Records are hash-chained. An export can be verified offline. | The default deployment has zero independent witnesses. | Partial. |
| Least privilege | Grants are task-scoped and have a time to live (TTL). | Some calls mint and execute in one step. A separate present-grant path exists. One-step path: /v1/brokered. Present-grant path: POST /v1/grants/present. | Partial. |
| Isolation and residency | Records are separated by tenant in the stores. | There is no structural virtual-machine (VM) isolation. | Partial. |
| Segregation of duties | An agent cannot approve itself. Actions registered as irreversible require human approval on enforced paths. | There is no executor/verifier model-family separation. | Partial. |
| Reproducibility | The stored decision record and its accompanying records file support review. The aaesctl evidence verify command checks that this file matches the export commitments. | The export entry projection (aaes.export/v2 and the current aaes.export/v3) omits the policy-bundle hash (policy_bundle_hash). | Implemented. |
| Recorded model identity and capability version | Model identity and capability version are on the sealed record and the records sidecar. | Those fields are not in the export entry (aaes.export/v2 or the current aaes.export/v3); inspect the records sidecar and verify its binding to the export commitments. | Partial. |
Next step
Scope an evaluation
Identify the application, data, access, and approval path. Define the records the reviewer needs to inspect.