AAES is built against the Cloud Security Alliance's Autonomous Action Runtime Management (AARM) specification. This page explains the specification and the drafts AAES has mapped, the implementation evidence AAES has recorded internally, and the requirements still open.
These pages describe the product. They are not a certification or a legal opinion.
Reading this note
The specification is the authoritative source for its own content, and the drafts AAES mapped can still move. Where this page states an AAES position, it is pinned to a dated draft and a dated internal record; a later edition may change clause numbering or coverage. Nothing here is an assessment result: no external assessment of AAES against AARM has been performed.
AAES is a member of the CSA AARM working group, so this note is written by a participant in the draft's own working group, not by an outside reviewer. Membership is not an endorsement of AAES by CSA, and it is not an assessment.
Instrument identity
- Title
- Autonomous Action Runtime Management (AARM)
- Public publication
- AARM v1.0, published February 2026 (arXiv:2602.09433; aarm.dev/spec). It sets nine requirements, R1 to R6 for Core conformance and R1 to R9 for Extended. The public specification page lists v2.0 as planned, with no public draft as of 29 October 2026.
- Drafts AAES mapped
- AAES's internal gap register maps two pre-publication drafts: an AARM/CS 1 first-edition conformance catalog (controls R1 to R11) and a 2.0 working draft dated 16 September 2026 (scope and assessment rows S.01 to S.06, organizational rows ORG, COM and OSS). AAES reviewed copies of both; neither was on the public AARM site at this review. Their numbering differs from public v1.0, and the register pins them as of 26 September 2026.
- Issuing body
- Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), AARM working group
- Instrument type
- Open specification for the agent action layer (not a formal standard, not a regulation)
- Official source
- CSA AARM working group page
The draft catalog's rows R1 to R11 cover the action layer directly: pre-execution interception, context accumulation, intent-aligned policy, authorization decisions, tamper-evident receipts, identity binding, least privilege at the tool boundary, telemetry export, behavioral analytics, risk classification, and provenance. The 2.0 working draft adds scope and assessment requirements (S.01 to S.06) and organizational requirements (ORG, COM, OSS).
AAES's position, dated
Internal implementation review against the pinned AARM working draft. No independent conformance assessment has been completed. The engineering rows other than R9 have internal implementation and test evidence available for inspection during an evaluation.
Recorded 26 September 2026 against the AARM 2.0 working draft of 16 September 2026: the internal gap register records R4 and R10 as met, with stated limits; R1 to R3, R5 to R8 and R11 as partial; and R9 as a gap, deferred deliberately. The changes behind those rows and prior findings had an AI-assisted static review. That review is not an independent assessment, a whole-system review, or a test of a running deployment.
Community engagement closed on 27 September 2026 with a dated representative designation and current working-group membership, both recorded internally.
The remaining requirements concern company registration, formal security assurance, a benchmarking decision and adoption evidence. Each needs its own evidence and has a stated closure path.
Where AAES uses the word conformant internally, it means conformant to the AARM draft as pinned on 2026-09-26, with those open organizational rows named in the same sentence; the word is not used as a standalone public claim, because no assessment has passed.
For procurement teams, the practical reading is: the engineering rows other than R9 have internal implementation and test evidence available for inspection, and most remain partial; the organizational rows depend on business events (commissioned assurance, adoption) that remain open.
Row status, summarized
The table below summarizes the internal clause-level gap register; it does not list every clause. A dated extract may be shared under NDA as part of the NDA appendix.
| Row group | AAES status | Boundary |
|---|---|---|
| R1–R11 action-layer controls | Internal gap register: R4 met, with MODIFY declared unsupported. R10 met over metadata. R1 to R3, R5 to R8 and R11 partial, with named clause elements open. R9 is a gap, deferred deliberately: AAES Govern has no behavioral analytics. Changes and prior findings had an AI-assisted static review on 26 September 2026; this is not independent human or runtime assurance. | Status is against the pinned draft; a revised draft can reopen rows. Enforcement still depends on control of the agent's credential path in a given deployment. |
| S.01–S.06 scope and assessment | Partly in place: the claim document, assessment-record format, change-reassessment procedure, and clause-mapped test suites exist in draft clause shape. None of these has completed an external assessment (missing); each document names its own open items in its status line (partial). | Filing records in the draft's formats does not make them an assessment; the documents say so in their own status lines. |
| ORG / COM / OSS organizational rows | Mostly open. Community engagement closed 27 September 2026 (dated representative designation and current working-group membership, recorded internally). The operator is AAES LLC, a Delaware limited liability company. Registered address for legal notices: 8 The Green STE B, Dover, DE 19901, United States. Contact: support@aaes.ai. No SOC 2 or ISO/IEC 27001 attestation exists, benchmarking is undecided, and no production adoption exists to start the adoption-evidence clock. | These rows close on business events, not code. Their closure paths are stated in the internal register and are not engineering commitments. |
Preconditions and gaps
- The draft can move. Every position on this page is pinned to the 16 September 2026 working draft as recorded on 26 September 2026. A new edition requires a re-read before the position is restated.
- Readiness is not an assessment. No external assessor has examined AAES against AARM. The internal claim document is unsubmitted by design.
- Credential-path control is required. Activity outside AAES Govern is visible only where telemetry is supplied. Observation is not enforcement.
- No SOC 2 report or penetration-test report exists. AAES has a documented scope and test plan for an independent penetration test. See security disclosures.
- No production adoption as of this review. Deployments are self-hosted or hosted by AAES.
For implementation and testing details beyond this note, use Security and implementation posture and the evaluation page.
Results from a client's test tenant are produced during a scoped evaluation.
Client responsibility
The client remains responsible for its own control position. AAES is not an AARM implementation service or a conformity instrument. The client remains the regulated entity.
Choose the tool actions to test, identify who holds their credentials, and list the questions the decision records should answer.